Permalink Submitted by jwilliams on Sat, 10/01/2022 - 9:36pm
Shalom Jon!
Thanks for the comment and thoughts. I agree that divorce, even when allowed is not commanded. As I pointed out in the article, I don't believe that God made allowance for hardhearted divorces in the "just, righteous, good" and "perfect" law that He gave. Joseph was called "righteous" for considering divorce for Mary, so I don't think we can say that when divorce is allowed that it is always less than ideal. Generally though, forgiveness is promoted and it seems that that often would be the better course. But since it can be "righteous" to divorce, we know that the option itself is not hardhearted to exercise, but rather the command was given to impede those who were hardhearted from acting hardhearted. In other words, divorce must be the alternative to something worse that a hardhearted man would do.
Regarding the objections from the "he may not put her away all his days" passages, there are many times in the law that we are told something is true in a particular case. It does not follow that outside of that case, things are guaranteed to be different. In fact we can often see that the rule is the same in other cases, while also being directly codified in one. Priests are told not to defile the sanctuary, but it does not follow that non-priests can defile it. A father can refuse to give his daughter in marriage to the suitor if she has been seduced, but if does not follow that a father must give his daughter in marriage to anyone who asks if they have not seduced her. The same goes for these men who cannot divorce their wife "all his days." It does not logically follow that we can assume that other men would be allowed to divorce their wives "all their days" otherwise.
In Deuteronomy 22:29, the Hebrew of the passage actually uses past tense all the way up to "she shall be his wife" which is in the future tense. This is then basically a statement about a situation in which the violation and the payment of the shekels has already occurred in the past and the "she is to be his wife" part is in the future. It parallels betrothal with the difference that they already had sex. Thus this plugs the loophole that a scoundrel might try to pull in that non-virgins could normally be divorced during the betrothal. The fact that looking at the tenses shows it is specifically about a betrothal time frame is pretty strong evidence that that is when a divorce might normally be given.
The prohibition on the man who raised a false rumor about his bride not being a virgin isn't clearly connected to betrothal, but it does make sense to be stated. If his wife does not end up executed, then this accuser would be likely to try the "next best thing" in his eyes and divorce her. The passage makes it clear that since (as his testimony at the trial proved) this man has consummated the marriage with her he cannot divorce her.
Keep in mind that if divorce under the law is limited to sexual immorality (as Yeshua and the Shammai side of the first century debate held) then this divorce prohibition actually becomes a punishment on the wife if divorce is allowed after consummation. After consummation, sexual immorality by her is adultery and punishable by death. If the husband normally had the option to show mercy and divorce her instead, the punishment is on her, not him.
Regarding Deuteronomy 24 you asked, "If "uncleanness" necessarily means sexual promiscuity taking place prior to consummation why not say that?" The simple answer would be that non-virgins can marry as well. If they were found pregnant during the betrothal like Mary was, then they too would be divorceable for the "matter of nakedness." Specifying virginity alone would leave out situations that need to be covered so a more general term was used.
With your next couple comments (and your final thought) I think you are missing that Deuteronomy 24:1-2 is about a situation that has not yet progressed to consummation. In many cultures that practiced the virginity check (and some still do!) it is not uncommon for this to be done by the midwives of the community prior to the couple entering the chamber. In fact, the fulfillment of the feasts in Leviticus 23 as related to a marriage play this out. In Passover we have the bride price paid, in Shavuot the covenant agreed to and written on our hearts, in Trumpets, the announcement of the coming of the Groom, in Day of Atonement, the examination of the bride before the entering of the wedding chamber that is Tabernacles. No need to worry about a drunken or inexperienced groom as the check was done before entering the bed.
This can also be deduced by looking at the big picture of what violations are already covered elsewhere in the Torah. You seem to accept that Yeshua made the condition for divorce found in Deuteronomy 24 more strict, relegating it to sexual immorality alone. Yet even this leaves you with a problem because if sexual immorality is included as something that "matter of nakedness" means then where does it fit in the big picture? This chart http://daringtheology.com/unfaithful-wife-torah might help clarify what the article went through. There is no place to put this unfaithfulness that can end in divorce except pre-consummation.
To avoid this big picture restriction, one would actually need to argue that "matter of nakedness" does not even include unfaithfulness at all and that Yeshua totally switched things up replacing that with "fornication" rather than upholding the Torah. I don't think either of us are willing to go there.
I agree Yeshua's clarification on the "matter of nakedness" shows us that fornication is a requirement to proceed to an allowed divorce. It lets us know that the "if a man" statement in Deuteronomy 24:1-2 is an actual allowance for the particular situation and not just an "if someone does this" with no comment on the morality of it. However this does not mean there were not also non-legitimate divorces being given out. Nothing in the Torah or NT gives us reason to think that the second divorce mentioned in Deuteronomy 24 was valid or allowed. In fact, the reason is only given as "he hates her" which violates what Yeshua says as well as the very command to "love your wife." It should not be taken as a good thing or a valid option.
As you point out, things are not always as clearly stated as we would like because some things were obvious to them at the time, which is why using all of scripture, such as Yeshua and Paul's statements to verify is so important here. Without 1 Corinthians 11, we would likely miss that the head covering is not just cultural within the Torah, but something of spiritual significance. Without Yeshua clarifying, we might think that divorce was allowed for other causes than fornication in the Torah.
Maybe you are suggesting that Yeshua taught against or changed Torah in some way. (Some of your thoughts sound like you are going there.) My own take is that Yeshua upheld and explained the law, correcting misinterpretations, but not changing anything. Am I getting you wrong?
Going through your last list of lettered points:
A. It is an "if" passage, but Yeshua clarifies it for us.
B. Torah doesn't seem to limit a valid divorce to this situation alone, but Yeshua clarifies it for us.
C. I agree that a divorce does give the woman technical freedom to remarry even if given for the wrong reason. However, Yeshua is correct when he says that the man who gives such a divorce "causes her to commit adultery." He can't cause adultery if she isn't still married in reality. It will be adultery, but her sin will be on the husband who divorced her, rather than on her.
D. A man who marries the divorced woman in Deuteronomy 24 does become her husband because this is describing a divorce for the legitimate reason as Yeshua clarified. Outside of that legitimate reason, Yeshua says that marrying another results in adultery so the marriage must still be in effect.
E. As I explained above, the second husband's divorce is not stated by Torah or Yeshua to be legitimate. It is done only for hate. (An alternative and edge case would be that the first husband discovers she is not a virgin and the second husband discovers she is pregnant. So there could be a chain of valid divorces, even if it would be somewhat rare.)
F. Again, we have to assume the opposite of what is stated to conclude that the Torah implies she can marry any other man, (which is not safe) but either way, Yeshua clarifies this is not the case as only a divorce "for fornication" would prevent her remarriage from being adultery.
In Matthew 19:7-8 we see that Yeshua includes the whole divorce process in His contextual definition of "put away." Similarly Joseph was going to justly "put away" Mary which would imply that word means the whole process if "putting away" without a writing was the problem Yeshua was addressing. It doesn't really work to try to make it into a "paperwork" based objection.
When it comes down to it, Yeshua is quite clear that divorce and remarriage that wasn't because of sexual sin is adultery. I don't think saying that is going out on a limb at all. (Even if we accept that Torah once allowed it, Yeshua has now forbidden it.)
When we take Yeshua's statement at face value that "a man shall cleave unto his wife and they become one flesh" (note this is when a husband and wife are one flesh, not random strangers) and "what God has joined together let not man put asunder," then extending His "fornication" to mean adultery after marriage doesn't fit. And applying the Torah to that question, adultery after marriage is a death penalty not a divorce, so Yeshua's face value statement is validated. So again, the statements are clear.
Between the two, I don't see wiggle room to avoid the conclusion that divorce after consummation simply isn't an allowance within scripture. So while calling legitimate marriages adultery would be a terrible thing, it would be just as serious to call adultery a legitimate marriage. This is one of those topics where there is no safe middle ground.
Response to Jon
Shalom Jon!
Thanks for the comment and thoughts. I agree that divorce, even when allowed is not commanded. As I pointed out in the article, I don't believe that God made allowance for hardhearted divorces in the "just, righteous, good" and "perfect" law that He gave. Joseph was called "righteous" for considering divorce for Mary, so I don't think we can say that when divorce is allowed that it is always less than ideal. Generally though, forgiveness is promoted and it seems that that often would be the better course. But since it can be "righteous" to divorce, we know that the option itself is not hardhearted to exercise, but rather the command was given to impede those who were hardhearted from acting hardhearted. In other words, divorce must be the alternative to something worse that a hardhearted man would do.
Regarding the objections from the "he may not put her away all his days" passages, there are many times in the law that we are told something is true in a particular case. It does not follow that outside of that case, things are guaranteed to be different. In fact we can often see that the rule is the same in other cases, while also being directly codified in one. Priests are told not to defile the sanctuary, but it does not follow that non-priests can defile it. A father can refuse to give his daughter in marriage to the suitor if she has been seduced, but if does not follow that a father must give his daughter in marriage to anyone who asks if they have not seduced her. The same goes for these men who cannot divorce their wife "all his days." It does not logically follow that we can assume that other men would be allowed to divorce their wives "all their days" otherwise.
In Deuteronomy 22:29, the Hebrew of the passage actually uses past tense all the way up to "she shall be his wife" which is in the future tense. This is then basically a statement about a situation in which the violation and the payment of the shekels has already occurred in the past and the "she is to be his wife" part is in the future. It parallels betrothal with the difference that they already had sex. Thus this plugs the loophole that a scoundrel might try to pull in that non-virgins could normally be divorced during the betrothal. The fact that looking at the tenses shows it is specifically about a betrothal time frame is pretty strong evidence that that is when a divorce might normally be given.
The prohibition on the man who raised a false rumor about his bride not being a virgin isn't clearly connected to betrothal, but it does make sense to be stated. If his wife does not end up executed, then this accuser would be likely to try the "next best thing" in his eyes and divorce her. The passage makes it clear that since (as his testimony at the trial proved) this man has consummated the marriage with her he cannot divorce her.
Keep in mind that if divorce under the law is limited to sexual immorality (as Yeshua and the Shammai side of the first century debate held) then this divorce prohibition actually becomes a punishment on the wife if divorce is allowed after consummation. After consummation, sexual immorality by her is adultery and punishable by death. If the husband normally had the option to show mercy and divorce her instead, the punishment is on her, not him.
Regarding Deuteronomy 24 you asked, "If "uncleanness" necessarily means sexual promiscuity taking place prior to consummation why not say that?" The simple answer would be that non-virgins can marry as well. If they were found pregnant during the betrothal like Mary was, then they too would be divorceable for the "matter of nakedness." Specifying virginity alone would leave out situations that need to be covered so a more general term was used.
With your next couple comments (and your final thought) I think you are missing that Deuteronomy 24:1-2 is about a situation that has not yet progressed to consummation. In many cultures that practiced the virginity check (and some still do!) it is not uncommon for this to be done by the midwives of the community prior to the couple entering the chamber. In fact, the fulfillment of the feasts in Leviticus 23 as related to a marriage play this out. In Passover we have the bride price paid, in Shavuot the covenant agreed to and written on our hearts, in Trumpets, the announcement of the coming of the Groom, in Day of Atonement, the examination of the bride before the entering of the wedding chamber that is Tabernacles. No need to worry about a drunken or inexperienced groom as the check was done before entering the bed.
This can also be deduced by looking at the big picture of what violations are already covered elsewhere in the Torah. You seem to accept that Yeshua made the condition for divorce found in Deuteronomy 24 more strict, relegating it to sexual immorality alone. Yet even this leaves you with a problem because if sexual immorality is included as something that "matter of nakedness" means then where does it fit in the big picture? This chart http://daringtheology.com/unfaithful-wife-torah might help clarify what the article went through. There is no place to put this unfaithfulness that can end in divorce except pre-consummation.
To avoid this big picture restriction, one would actually need to argue that "matter of nakedness" does not even include unfaithfulness at all and that Yeshua totally switched things up replacing that with "fornication" rather than upholding the Torah. I don't think either of us are willing to go there.
I agree Yeshua's clarification on the "matter of nakedness" shows us that fornication is a requirement to proceed to an allowed divorce. It lets us know that the "if a man" statement in Deuteronomy 24:1-2 is an actual allowance for the particular situation and not just an "if someone does this" with no comment on the morality of it. However this does not mean there were not also non-legitimate divorces being given out. Nothing in the Torah or NT gives us reason to think that the second divorce mentioned in Deuteronomy 24 was valid or allowed. In fact, the reason is only given as "he hates her" which violates what Yeshua says as well as the very command to "love your wife." It should not be taken as a good thing or a valid option.
As you point out, things are not always as clearly stated as we would like because some things were obvious to them at the time, which is why using all of scripture, such as Yeshua and Paul's statements to verify is so important here. Without 1 Corinthians 11, we would likely miss that the head covering is not just cultural within the Torah, but something of spiritual significance. Without Yeshua clarifying, we might think that divorce was allowed for other causes than fornication in the Torah.
Maybe you are suggesting that Yeshua taught against or changed Torah in some way. (Some of your thoughts sound like you are going there.) My own take is that Yeshua upheld and explained the law, correcting misinterpretations, but not changing anything. Am I getting you wrong?
Going through your last list of lettered points:
A. It is an "if" passage, but Yeshua clarifies it for us.
B. Torah doesn't seem to limit a valid divorce to this situation alone, but Yeshua clarifies it for us.
C. I agree that a divorce does give the woman technical freedom to remarry even if given for the wrong reason. However, Yeshua is correct when he says that the man who gives such a divorce "causes her to commit adultery." He can't cause adultery if she isn't still married in reality. It will be adultery, but her sin will be on the husband who divorced her, rather than on her.
D. A man who marries the divorced woman in Deuteronomy 24 does become her husband because this is describing a divorce for the legitimate reason as Yeshua clarified. Outside of that legitimate reason, Yeshua says that marrying another results in adultery so the marriage must still be in effect.
E. As I explained above, the second husband's divorce is not stated by Torah or Yeshua to be legitimate. It is done only for hate. (An alternative and edge case would be that the first husband discovers she is not a virgin and the second husband discovers she is pregnant. So there could be a chain of valid divorces, even if it would be somewhat rare.)
F. Again, we have to assume the opposite of what is stated to conclude that the Torah implies she can marry any other man, (which is not safe) but either way, Yeshua clarifies this is not the case as only a divorce "for fornication" would prevent her remarriage from being adultery.
In Matthew 19:7-8 we see that Yeshua includes the whole divorce process in His contextual definition of "put away." Similarly Joseph was going to justly "put away" Mary which would imply that word means the whole process if "putting away" without a writing was the problem Yeshua was addressing. It doesn't really work to try to make it into a "paperwork" based objection.
When it comes down to it, Yeshua is quite clear that divorce and remarriage that wasn't because of sexual sin is adultery. I don't think saying that is going out on a limb at all. (Even if we accept that Torah once allowed it, Yeshua has now forbidden it.)
When we take Yeshua's statement at face value that "a man shall cleave unto his wife and they become one flesh" (note this is when a husband and wife are one flesh, not random strangers) and "what God has joined together let not man put asunder," then extending His "fornication" to mean adultery after marriage doesn't fit. And applying the Torah to that question, adultery after marriage is a death penalty not a divorce, so Yeshua's face value statement is validated. So again, the statements are clear.
Between the two, I don't see wiggle room to avoid the conclusion that divorce after consummation simply isn't an allowance within scripture. So while calling legitimate marriages adultery would be a terrible thing, it would be just as serious to call adultery a legitimate marriage. This is one of those topics where there is no safe middle ground.